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Abstract. We consider a setting where records containing sensitive per-
sonal information are stored on a remote database managed by a storage
provider. Each record in the database is co-owned by a ﬁxed number of
parties called data-subjects. The paper proposes a protocol that allows
data-subjects to grant access to their records, to self-approved parties,
without the DB manager being able to learn if and when their records are
accessed. We provide constructions that allow a Receiver party to retrieve
a DB record only if he has authorizations from all owners of the target
record (respectively, from a subset of the owners of size greater than a
threshold.) We also provide a construction where owners of the same
record do not have equal ownership rights, and the record in question is
retrieved using a set of authorizations consistent with a general access
structure. The proposed constructions are eﬃcient and use a pairing-
based signature scheme. The presented protocol is proved secure under
the Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman assumption.
1 Introduction
Achieving a good quality of service and a high operational eﬃciency have al-
ways been a top priority for governments and businesses alike. Over the years,
organizations both from the public and private sectors have experimented with a
variety of technical choices and policies to improve the quality of their services.
One technical choice that seems to be turning into a trend is the widespread
adoption of information technologies and the continuous migration of services
from the traditional paper-based world to the electronic world. The latter has a
number of advantages, among which we note the greater convenience and speed
to access data, which in turn translate into shorter processing delays, less errors,
better statistics, higher cost-eﬃciency, and better auditing and fraud detection
mechanisms.
Despite all the above beneﬁts, users are still showing a certain reluctance
and skepticism towards newly introduced electronic systems. The reason for this
skepticism is mainly attributed to the lack of assurances about the way sensitive
user data is handled, and the implications that may result from it on users’
privacy.
To reduce this lack of trust, it is important that the new systems be designed
in a way that gives users increased control over their data. Research on this topic
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received a signiﬁcant attention in the past (e.g., [1,2,3,4,5,6]). More recently, a
partial solution that contributes to reinforcing user’s control over their data,
has been proposed in [7]. This solution, called accredited symmetrically private
information retrieval (ASPIR), assumes a setting where sensitive information
belonging to users (data-subjects) is stored on a remote database DB managed
by a party called a Sender. The setting includes an additional party called a
Receiver who retrieves records from the database. The construction in [7], allows
a Receiver to retrieve data owned by the user (data-subject), from a database DB
managed by the Sender, such that the following three requirements are satisﬁed:
(1) Privacy for the data-subject: the Receiver can retrieve a data record only
if he has a valid authorization to do so from the record owner, (2) Privacy for
the Receiver: the Sender is convinced that the Receiver’s query is authorized by
the owner of the target DB record, without learning any information about the
content of the query, or the identity of the record owner, and (3) Privacy for the
Sender: the Receiver cannot retrieve information about more than one record
per query. For example, the Receiver cannot use an authorization from user U
to learn information about database records not belonging to U.
The constructions in [7] cover a setting where each record in the database
is owned by a single user. In many applications, data records are the property
of several parties simultaneously rather than a single one. For example, in the
healthcare domain, a medical procedure is performed by a doctor on a patient
within the premises of a hospital. It may be natural in some jurisdictions that
all three parties, namely the patient, doctor, and hospital, have a right to the
database record documenting the medical procedure. As a result, a Receiver
(e.g., a second doctor) who wants to have access to the above record, needs an
authorization from all three record owners. With the obtained authorizations,
the Receiver should be able to retrieve the target record subject to the following
conditions: (1) the Receiver can retrieve the record in question only if he has the
approval of all record owners, (2) the Sender is convinced that the Receiver’s
query is approved by the owners of the target data, without learning any infor-
mation about the index of the target data, or the identity of the authorizers,
and (3) the Receiver cannot retrieve information about records other than the
one deﬁned in the submitted query.
The ASPIR constructions of [7] rely on privacy-preserving digital creden-
tials [4] to protect the anonymity of the authorizer with respect to the Sender.
The digital credential primitive has been used in addition to hide the index of
the retrieved record, and to guarantee the unforgeability of the issued authoriza-
tions. While highly versatile, the digital credentials of [4] do require a certain
amount of computations from the diﬀerent participants, especially the authoriz-
ers. In addition, the construction in [7] assumes that each record owner possesses
a digital credential of the type in [4], and that he is willing to use it to issue
authorizations.
In this work, we extend the ASPIR protocol of [7] to a context where each
database record can have multiple owners. The protocol we present in this paper
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fashion, unlike the construction in [7] which works speciﬁcally for Lipmaa’s SPIR
scheme [8]. Our construction is more eﬃcient than the one in [7], and uses a
lightweight pairing-based signature scheme similar to that in [9] instead of digital
credentials. In this work, we also propose a t-out-of-n threshold multi-authorizer
ASPIR variant, where records can be privately retrieved by a Receiver as long
as he has authorizations from t out of the n owners of the target record.
The paper ﬁnally treats a setting where the owners’ rights to a record are not
necessarily equal. For example one could imagine a setting where an authoriza-
tion from the patient is suﬃcient to access his medical record, while authoriza-
tions from both the doctor and hospital are necessary to access the same record.
The latter could be useful in cases of emergency where the patient is unable to
grant an authorization.
2 Related Work
The problem of managing personal data according to privacy policies deﬁned
by the data owners, has been considered by a number of authors. In [10,11],
Bagga et al. propose a primitive called policy-based encryption. Policy-based
encryption allows a user to encrypt a message with respect to an access policy
formalized as a monotone Boolean expression. The encryption is such that only
a user having access to a qualiﬁed set of credentials, complying with the policy,
is able to successfully decrypt the message. The context in [10,11], however, is
diﬀerent from the one in this paper, since the goal there is to allow the user
to send a secret message to a designated set of players deﬁned by a policy. In
our context, the target data is already stored in a database, and the goal is to
allow parties authorized by the data owners to retrieve this data, without the
database manager learning which data has been retrieved or the identity of the
data owners.
In [12], Song et al. present a scheme allowing keyword search on encrypted
data. Their setting consists of a user, and a server storing encrypted data owned
by the user. The server can process search queries on the user’s stored ciphertext,
only if given proper authorization from the user. The scheme in [12] also sup-
ports hidden user queries, where the server conducts the search without learning
anything about the content of the query. Although related to our context, it is
not clear how the work in [12] can be applied to the problem we describe in this
paper, since delegating querying capabilities to a third party (e.g., a Receiver)
may require the user to reveal his encryption key, and thus share all of his past
and future secrets. Besides, it is not clear how the scheme in [12] can hide the
identity of the data-owner from the server, or how it can impose restrictions
(e.g., wrt. time or usage) on the search capabilities delegated to a third party.
Finally, in [13] Aiello et al. consider a scenario where users privately retrieve
data from a database containing a set of priced data items. The proposed proto-
col is called priced oblivious transfer, and allows a user U, who made an initial
deposit, to buy diﬀerent data items, without the database manager learning
which items U is buying, subject to the condition that U’s balance contains390 M. Layouni, M. Yoshida, and S. Okamura
suﬃcient funds. We believe the construction in [13] is the ﬁrst to consider im-
posing additional requirements on oblivious transfer protocols. While interesting
in their own right, the added requirements do not address the issue of protecting
the identity of the data owners.
3 Summary of Contribution and Paper Organization
We propose a multi-authorizer accredited SPIR scheme where data records
stored on a Sender’s database can be retrieved by a Receiver only if (1) the
latter has authorizations to do so from the target record owners, and (2) with-
out the Sender learning information about the index of the retrieved record or
the identity of any of the record owners. In addition, the proposed scheme allows
record owners to encode, in the issued authorizations, any privacy policy they
want to enforce on their data, including the Receiver’s identity, an expiry date
etc. The paper also proposes a variant scheme for t-out-of-n threshold access,
where a Receiver is able to retrieve a data record only if it has authorizations
from at least t out of the n owners of the record. Finally, the paper treats a
setting where owners of a record have unequal rights. In this setting, records
are retrieved in accordance with a general access structure reﬂecting the non-
uniformity of owners’ rights.
In Section 4, we introduce few deﬁnitions, and describe the SPIR primitive
which we use as a building block in our construction. In Section 5, we present
our main multi-authorizer ASPIR construction. In Section 6, we evaluate the
security and privacy of the proposed scheme. In Section 8, we brieﬂy describe an
extension to t-out-of-n threshold access, and treat the more general case where
owners have unequal rights in Section 9. We conclude in Section 11.
4 Preliminaries
The construction we present uses a pairing-based signature scheme similar to [9],
and relies on the hardness of the Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (BDH). We
ﬁrst introduce bilinear maps, and BDH, and describe the pairing-based signature
and SPIR building blocks.
Deﬁnition 1 (Admissible bilinear pairings). Let (G1,×) and (G2,×) be
multiplicative groups of the same prime order q. Assume that the discrete log-
arithm problem in G1 or G2 is hard, an admissible bilinear pairing is a map
e : G1 × G1 → G2 satisfying the following properties:
– Bilinearity: For all P,Q ∈ G1,a n dα,β ∈ Z∗
q, e(P α,Q β)=e(P,Q)αβ.
– Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q)  =1 G2.
– Computability: Given P,Q ∈ G1, there is an eﬃcient algorithm to compute
e(P,Q).
Deﬁnition 2 (Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Problem). Let e : G1 × G1 → G2
be an admissible bilinear map, and let P be a generator of G1.F o ra,b,c ∈ Z∗
q,
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4.1 Pairing-Based Signature Scheme
Let e : G1×G1 → G2 be an admissible bilinear map, and let P be a generator of
G1. Assume the signer has a private key sk := x ∈ Z∗
q, and a correspondingpublic
key pk := P x. To sign a message m, the signer computes σ := H(m)x,w h e r eH :
{0,1}∗ → G1 is a public collision-resistant one-way function. The veriﬁer accepts
σ  as a valid signature on m  with respect to pk,o n l yi fe(σ ,P)=e(H(m ),pk)
holds.
4.2 Symmetrically Private Information Retrieval
A private information retrieval scheme or PIR for short, involves two players: a
Sender and a Receiver. The Sender manages a database DB, and answers queries
on DB submitted by the Receiver. The main goal of PIR schemes is to allow the
Receiver to retrieve a DB record of his choice without the Sender learning the
content of his query, and without resorting to the trivial and ineﬃcient method
where the Sender just returns the whole database back to the Receiver. The
property of hiding the content of the Receiver’s query from the Sender is called
Privacy for the Receiver.
PIR schemes are mainly concerned with providing Privacy for the Receiver.
There are settings however, where the Sender too is interested in controlling
access to his database. For example, the Sender could be a multimedia provider
with a business model based on charging a fee for every piece of content accessed
in his database. A solution to this type of settings can be obtained by using
Symmetrically Private Information Retrieval schemes or SPIR for short.
A SPIR scheme allows a Receiver to eﬃciently retrieve records from the
Sender’s database such that the following two properties are assured:
– Privacy for the Receiver: the sender does not learn any information about
the index of the target record
– Privacy for the Sender: the Receiver does not learn any information on the
database content, other than the target record.
The above properties, namely Privacy for the Receiver, and Privacy for the
Sender can be either perfect, statistical or computational. For example, Lipmaa
proposes in [8] a SPIR scheme that is computationally private for the Receiver
and perfectly private for the Sender.
A signiﬁcant number of PIR and SPIR schemes can be found in the literature
(e.g., [14,15,16,8,17]) with various performance levels, and a multitude of features
such as :
– Single-DB (e.g., [15]) vs. multiple-DB Senders (e.g., [14].)
– Use of algebraic properties (e.g., homomorphic encryption [8] and φ-assump-
tion [16]) vs. non-algebraic properties (e.g., existence of one-way trapdoor
permutation [15].)
– Index-based (e.g., [8,16]) vs. keyword-based queries (e.g., [18].)
M o r ei n f o r m a t i o no nt h e s ea n do t h e rd i ﬀ e r e n c e sc a nb ef o u n di n[ 1 9 , 2 0 ] .F o r
the purpose of this paper however, we do not discuss these features any further,
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Notations. In the remainder of this paper we assume that we have a SPIR scheme
denoted SPIR.L e ts be the secret index of the record the Receiver is interested in.
The Receiver uses the public information, and possibly his private information
to compute a SPIR query encoding s.W ed e n o t eb yQSPIR the query the Receiver
submits to the Sender. Let RSPIR be the Sender’s answer to the Receiver’s query.
The Receiver then uses his private information and s, to recover DB[s]f r o m
RSPIR.
5 Protocol Description
The multi-authorizer accredited SPIR protocol we propose relies on the two
building blocks described above. We start by describing a ﬁrst construction in
section 5.2, and then present a more eﬃcient one in section 5.3. We assume the
public parameters of the above building blocks are already known to all parties:
the Sender, the Receiver, and the Authorizers.
5.1 Settings
We assume that multiple parties play the Authorizer role, as opposed to one
single party as in [7]. Without loss of generality, we assume that we have three
types of Authorizers A,B, and C. For example, A could represent the Patients,
B the Doctors, and C the Hospitals. In addition, our setting contains a database
DB of size N managed by the Sender. Each record in DB belongs to a triplet of
parties (A,B,C)f r o mt h es e tA×B×C. The owners (A,B,C) of a given record
may or may not have the same rights (depending on the privacy laws in place.)
Section 9 treats the case where owners have unequal rights.
Next we assume that each party has an identiﬁer ID, and that each record in
the database is labeled with the identity of its owners, e.g., (IDA,IDB,IDC). We
also assume the existence of a publicly known one-to-one correspondence between
ID triplets and the indexes of DB record, denoted index : A×B×C→[1,N].
Finally we assume that each DB record indexed by j, and corresponding to
identity triplet (IDj,1,IDj,2,IDj,3), contains a ﬁeld with the owners’ public keys
(pkj,1,pk j,2,pk j,3): =( P xj,1,Pxj,2,Pxj,3)s t o r e di ni t .
5.2 First Construction
Let (A,B,C) be a tuple of owners who are willing to authorize a Receiver RecID,
to retrieve their record indexed by s := index(IDA,IDB,IDC), according to a
usage policy P. Each of the owners ﬁrst provides the Receiver with a signature
σi(Pm): =( Pm)xi,f o rPm := H (s,RecID,P). Next, the Receiver prepares a
SPIR query QSPIR for index s, and submits RecID, P,a n dQSPIR to the Sender.
Upon receiving this information, the Sender ﬁrst authenticates1 RecID and
1 The receiver can be authenticated using conventional X.509 public key certiﬁcates
for example. In case the identity of the receiver needs to be protected, then privacy-
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veriﬁes that the submitted query is compliant with usage policy P.2 If one of
these checks fails the Sender aborts, else it proceeds with query. Next, for every
Authorizer type3, the Sender chooses a random blinding factor δi ∈ Z∗
q,( f o rt h e
purpose of our description we have i ∈ [1,3].) For each record DB[j], the Sender
computes Pmj := H (j,RecID,P)a n dD B
 [j]: =D B [ j]×
3
i=1 e((Pmj)δi,pk j,i)

.
The Sender then executes the SPIR scheme on QSPIR and DB
 , and returns the
response RSPIR to the Receiver along with (P)δ1,( P)δ2,a n d( P)δ3. The Receiver
ﬁrst recovers DB
 [s]f r o mRSPIR, and then computes
DB0[s]=D B
 [s] /
3 
i=1
e

σi(Pm),(P)δi
=D B [ s] ×
3 
i=1
e

(Pm,s)δi,pk s,i

/
3 
i=1
e

(Pm)xi,(P)δi
=D B [ s] ×

3 
i=1
e

(Pm,s)δi,Pxs,i
/e

(Pm)xi,Pδi
	
(∗)
=D B [ s] ×

3 
i=1
e

(Pm)δi,Pxi
/e

(Pm)xi,Pδi
	
=D B [ s]
(∗): the equality holds because for s = index(IDA,IDB,IDC), the keys xs,i are
no other than the secret keys xi of owners (A,B,C). Similarly Pm,s = Pm.
In the above solution, the Sender is required to (1) make a number of pair-
ings linear in the number of authorizer types (to compute each e((Pmj)δi,pk j,i),
i ∈ [1,n]), and (2) return (P)δi for each authorizer type. This results in com-
putational and communication complexities linear in the number of authorizer
types. We improve these complexities in the next section.
5.3 Improved Construction
Let (A,B,C) be a tuple of owners who are willing to authorize a Receiver RecID,
to retrieve their record indexed by s := index(IDA,IDB,IDC), according to a
usage policy P. Each of the owners ﬁrst provides the Receiver with a signature
σi(Pm): =( Pm)xi,f o rPm := H (s,RecID,P). The Receiver aggregates the σi’s
into one single signature Sig(Pm): =

u∈{A,B,C}σu(Pm). He then prepares a
SPIR query QSPIR for index s, and submits RecID, P,a n dQSPIR to the Sender as
in the ﬁrst construction. The Sender processes the Receiver’s query as in the ﬁrst
construction, except that here it chooses a single random blinding factor δ ∈ Z∗
q,
2 The policy P can be any Boolean statement of the form: “Receiver should be a
practicing surgeon accredited by the College of Physicians AND Retrieval date
prior to 31 July 2009” for instance. The policy can be encoded using state of the art
XML format for example.
3 As noted earlier, to keep the description simple we assumed three types A,B, and C.394 M. Layouni, M. Yoshida, and S. Okamura
Receiver (RecID) Public Info Sender (Database DB)
(Pm,σ u(Pm)),u ∈{ A,B,C}, for Pm := H(s,RecID,P),
where s := index(IDA,IDB,IDC), and P := {usage policy}
{pku}u∈{A,B,C}  {pks,i}1≤i≤3,e(·,·),P,G1 =  P ,G2,q, SPIR scheme
Sig(Pm)=

u∈{A,B,C}
σu(Pm)=

u∈{A,B,C}
(Pm)
xu =(Pm)


u
xu
Q = QSPIR(s)
Q, RecID, P
− −−−−−−−−−−− →
If RecID,P satisﬁed continue
else abort
Choose δ ∈R Z
∗
q
For j := 1 to N do :
Pmj = H(j,RecID,P)
DB
 [j] = DB[j]×
e

Pmj,
3
u=1 pkj,u
δ
Execute SPIR scheme on DB
  and Q
SPIR-recover DB
 [s] from Res
Res,P δ
←−−−−−−−− Let Res = RSPIR(Q,DB
 )
Output DB0[s]: =D B
 [s]/e(Sig(Pm),P
δ)
Fig.1. Multi-Authorizer ASPIR scheme (improved construction)
and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ N, computes DB
 [j]: =D B [ j] × e

Pmj,
3
u=1 pkj,u
δ
.
The use of a single blinding factor δ for all types of Authorizers will reduce the
Sender’s computational complexity from linear in the number of Authorizer types
to constant. A similar reduction is achieved in the size of the Sender’s response
which passes from linear in the number of Authorizer types to constant.
Finally, the Sender executes the SPIR scheme on QSPIR and DB
 , and returns
the response RSPIR to the Receiver along with δP. The Receiver then recov-
ers DB
 [s]f r o mRSPIR, and computes DB0[s]=D B
 [s]/e(Sig(Pm),Pδ), thereby
using the aggregate signature Sig(Pm) as if it was a “decryption key”. This ap-
proach of using signatures as decryption keys is of general interest, and could be
useful in the wider context of access control. A summary of the whole protocol
is given in Figure 1.
It can be easily checked that DB0[s] computed by the Receiver is the desired
record DB[s].
DB0[s]=D B
 [s]/e(Sig(Pm),Pδ)
=D B [ s] × e(Pm,
3 
u=1
pku)δ /e((Pm)

3
u=1 xu,Pδ)
=D B [ s] × e(Pm,P

3
u=1 xu)
δ /e((Pm)

3
u=1 xu,P)
δ
=D B [ s]Eﬃcient Multi-authorizer ASPIR 395
Remark. The usage policy P encoded in Pm can be any privacy policy the owners
want enforced on their record. This may include usage limitations such as an
expiry date, a description of what is considered an acceptable usage scenario
etc. Note that by binding authorizations to a speciﬁc Receiver exclusively, the
protocol is able to prevent pooling attacks4.
6 Security and Privacy Evaluation
Deﬁnition 3 (Valid Authorization). Let (A,B,C) be the owners of a record
in the Sender’s DB, indexed by s = index(IDA,IDB,IDC). For a given usage
policy P, a Receiver is said to have a valid authorization under P,f r o mo w n e r
O ∈{ A,B,C}, if and only if the Receiver has a valid signature from O on
Pm = H (s,ReceiverID,P),a n dP is satisﬁed at the time the authorization is
used.
Deﬁnition 4 (Secure ASPIR protocols). An ASPIR protocol is said to be
secure if (1) the protocol satisﬁes the “privacy for Receiver” and “privacy for
Sender” properties usually provided by conventional SPIR schemes, and (2) a
Receiver cannot retrieve a given record with non-negligible probability unless he
has authorizations from all owners of that record. For the special cases of thresh-
old ASPIR (resp., ASPIR with unequal ownership rights), we require the Receiver
to have authorizations from a subset of the owners of size greater than a threshold
(resp., a subset that is part of a given access structure.)
Theorem 1. Assuming the Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman problem is hard and the
SPIR primitive secure, the protocol of Figure 1 is a secure ASPIR protocol.
Proof. The protocol of Figure 1 is by assumption based on a secure SPIR primi-
tive. By examining the exchange of messages, it is easy to see that the protocol
of Figure 1 satisﬁes the “privacy for Receiver” and “privacy for Sender” prop-
erties already provided by the underlying SPIR primitive. In the following we
examine the second security criterion of deﬁnition 4.
We show that if an Adversary AASPIR can retrieve a record that AASPIR is
not authorized to obtain then the Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman problem can be solved.
In other words, we show how to construct an Adversary ABDH that uses AASPIR
to solve the Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman problem.
Let s be the index of the record targeted by the Adversary AASPIR playing
the role of a malicious Receiver. Let (IDA,IDB,IDC) be the identity tuple of the
corresponding owners, i.e., s = index(IDA,IDB,IDC). The Adversary AASPIR
submits a query and retrieves record DB[s] from the Sender’s response without
having all required authorizations from owners tuple (A,B,C). In the absence of
authorizations from owners tuple (A,B,C), the best scenario for the adversary
is to have valid signatures from two (out of the three) owners. Without loss of
generality, assume he has signatures from A and B.
4 Pooling attacks occur when diﬀerent receivers combine their authorizations in order
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For any given instance (P  ,(P  )a,(P  )b,(P  )c) of the BDH problem, the Ad-
versary ABDH obtains (abc) · e(P  ,P ) by interacting with AASPIR and playing
the role of the owners A and B, and the Sender as follows.
1. ABDH chooses random elements xA,x B of Z∗
q and sets P = P  , pkA =
(P  )xA, pkB =( P  )xB,a n dpkC =( P  )c.
2. ABDH gives P and {pki}i∈{A,B,C} to AASPIR.
3. ABDH sets Pm =( P  )b for the parameters s, RecID,a n dP (the hash function
H is assumed as a random oracle in this proof).
4. ABDH computes signatures σA(Pm)=( Pm)xA and σB(Pm)=( Pm)xB,a n d
gives them to AASPIR,a l o n gw i t hs, RecID, and usage policy P .
5. AASPIR submits Q := QSPIR(s), RecID, and usage policy P to ABDH.
6. ABDH sets :
– DB0[j]: =e

Pm,((P  )a)
(xA+xB)

for all j.
– P δ := (P  )a
ABDH then executes SPIR on DB0 and Q and returns Res = RSPIR =
SPIR(DB0,Q)a n dP δ to AASPIR.
7. AASPIR computes (this step could be done earlier)
Sig(Pm): =

i∈{A,B,C}
σi(Pm): =( P  )b(xA+xB+c)
8. AASPIR recovers DB0 =D B 0[s]f r o mRes and computes
DB = DB0 /e(Sig(Pm),Pδ)
= e

Pm,(P  )a(xA+xB)

/e((P  )b(xA+xB+c),(P  )a)
= e

(P  )b,(P  )a(xA+xB)

/e((P  )b(xA+xB+c),(P  )a)
= e(P  ,P )
ab(xA+xB) /e(P  ,P )ab(xA+xB+c)
= e(P  ,P )
(ab(xA+xB)−ab(xA+xB+c))
= e(P  ,P )
−(abc)
9. ABDH outputs DB
−1 = e(P  ,P )
abc
ABDH can solve the BDH problem using AASPIR. Therefore, assuming the BDH
problem is hard, computing a record without all the required valid authorizations
is unfeasible.
The above proof can be straightforwardly generalized to the case where records
belong to n owners, for n arbitrary. Similar theorems can be proved for the
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7 Performance Analysis
In this analysis we focus mainly on exponentiation operations; group operations
such as multiplications are signiﬁcantly cheaper. A pairing operation can be
reduced to a single exponentiation of size less than the group order (as noted
in [21]), and is therefore considered as a small-size exponentiation.
It is worth noting at this point that all SPIR schemes require Ω(|DB|)c o m -
putations form the Sender; if this is not the case, then the Sender will not touch
at least one record in the database, and thus can safely infer that the untouched
records are not being sought in the Receiver’s query, thereby violating the Re-
ceiver’s privacy. As a result of this observation, the Sender’s overallcomputations
cannot be expected to drop below this linear lower bound.
Let n be the number of owners of each record in the Sender’s database, and let
N be the database size. In addition to the basic operations required by the un-
derlying SPIR scheme, our protocol requires : (a) each owner of the target record
to perform one pre-computable exponentiation in G1, (b) the Receiver to per-
form a pre-computable n-point multiplication in G1 (to compute Sig(Pm)), and
one pairing, and (c) the Sender to perform N exponentiations and N pairings.
Despite the increase in functionalities, the protocol we propose does not lead
to higher computational cost compared to that of the underlying SPIR scheme
(which is linear in N.) Similarly, our communication performance is equivalent
to that of the underlying SPIR scheme, since we increase the amount of ex-
changed data only by a small constant. This is negligible, since the best known
communication complexity for SPIR achieved so far is O

log
2(N)

[17,8].
8 Extension to Threshold Access
In some applications it may be useful to provide a mechanism to allow a Receiver
to privately recover a certain record as long as he has authorizations from t out
of the n record owners. As in the basic case, the Sender should not learn the
identity of the Authorizers or the index of the retrieved record. We do this using
ideas similar to those in [22]. In the following, we only point out the changes
from the basic protocol of section 5.
Assume the record owners jointly select a master secret key MSK := x ∈ Z∗
q,
and distribute it veriﬁably among themselves in a (t,n)-secret sharing scheme.
We note that there is no need for a third party in the secret sharing procedure.
The n record owners can generate secret key MSK, and privately distribute
the shares among themselves without help from a trusted third party using
protocols such as [23,24]. The secret generation is such that no shareholder knows
MSK individually. Due to space limitations we do not expose the details of
those schemes here. Let xu,u ∈ [1,n]b et h en secret shares, and (sku,pk u): =
(xu,Pxu), u ∈ [1,n] the private/public key pairs of the record owners. The
master secret key x can be written as a Lagrange interpolation of any subset of
shares xu, of size greater or equal to t.L e tMPK := P x be the corresponding
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corresponding to identity triplet (IDj,1,···,ID j,n), contains a ﬁeld with the
master public key MPKj stored in it. Note that given the owners’ public keys
(pkj,1,···,pk j,n), anyone can reconstruct the corresponding master public key
MPKj by simple Lagrange interpolation.
A Receiver holding authorizations (Pm,σ u(Pm)) from at least t record owners
{u1,···,u t}, can reconstruct a signature on Pm with respect to the master public
key MPK, by computing Sig(Pm)=
t
v=1 σuv(Pm)Luv =( Pm)

t
v=1 Luvxuv =
(Pm)x,w h e r eLuv denote the appropriate Lagrange coeﬃcients5. The Receiver
then proceeds with the protocol as in the basic case, and submits QSPIR, RecID,
and usage policy P to the Sender.
The Sender checks the consistency of the submitted query with the Receiver’s
identity and usage setting, and chooses a random blinding factor δ ∈ Z∗
q.F o re a c h
record in the database indexed by j, the Sender computes Pmj,a n dD B 0[j]=
DB[j]×e(Pmj,MPKj)
δ. The rest of the protocol is similar to the one in Section 5.
9 Extension to Authorizers with Unequal Rights
Up to this point we have assumed that the owners of a given record all have equal
rights. In other words, if a record belongs to (A,B,C) then an authorization
from A is worth exactly the same as one from B or C. In some settings however,
owners of a record do not have equal rights. For instance in the healthcare
context, a medical record belonging to (patient A,d o c t o rB,h o s p i t a lC) should
be accessible only if authorizations are provided, say from A alone, or B and C
together. Authorizations from B or C alone are not suﬃcient. More generally,
f o rar e c o r dR owned by a set O = {A1,···,A n},w ed e n o t eb yA⊂2O the
subsets of O whose authorizations are suﬃcient to access R.T h es e tA is called
a generalized access structure. In the following we show how secret sharing with
a generalized access structure [25] can be used to realize multi-authorizer ASPIR
in a context where owners have unequal rights to their record.
Consider a database record R, and assume R’s owners agree on a generalized
access structure A. Using a method similar to that of Section 8, R’s owners
jointly select a master secret key MSK := x ∈ Z∗
q, and split it into shares among
themselves, according to the access structure A. The secret generation and
distribution are such that no shareholder knows MSK individually, and no help
from a secret sharing dealer is needed. More details on how this is done are
given in the example below. Each owner ends up with a share of information on
MSK, that he uses as a signing key. The master public key MPK corresponding
to MSK is stored in a ﬁeld within record R,a si nt h et h r e s h o l dc o n s t r u c t i o n
of Section 8. A Receiver then obtains signatures from a subset of owners as
in the threshold case. Next, the Receiver combines the partial signatures using
Lagrange interpolation in order to recover a valid signature with respect to mas-
ter key MPK. Recovering this signature is possible only if the Receiver obtains
partial signatures from a set of owners that is part of the access structure A.
5 The values of the Luv’s depend only on the values of the uv’s.Eﬃcient Multi-authorizer ASPIR 399
Example. Let R be a record belonging to (A1,A 2,A 3,A 4), who agree on access
structure A = {{A1,A 2,A 3},{A1,A 4},{A2,A 4},{A3,A 4}}.L e tx ∈ Z∗
q be the
master secret key MSK that (A1,A 2,A 3,A 4) select jointly. Let (x1,x 2,x 3,x 4)
be shares of x in a (4,4)-threshold secret sharing scheme. Assume we have a
mechanism to securely distribute share tuples (x2,x 4)t oA1,( x3,x 4)t oA2,
(x1,x 4)t oA3,a n d( x1,x 2,x 3)t oA4. It can be easily seen that the distributed
share tuples do satisfy the access structure A. Further details on how share
tuples are determined in the general case, can be found in [25].
The received xi’s are used by the owners as private signing keys to issue
authorizations. For example, a Receiver authorized by {A1,A 4}∈A , obtains
(Pm,σ 2(Pm),σ 4(Pm)) from A1,a n d( Pm,σ 1(Pm),σ 2(Pm),σ 3(Pm)) from A4,
where σi(Pm)=( Pm)xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. The Receiver then computes the sig-
nature on Pm with respect to master key MPK, by interpolating the σi’s as
follows : σ(Pm)=
4
v=1(σv(Pm))Lv,w h e r eLv denote the appropriate Lagrange
coeﬃcients. The reconstructed signature is later used by the Receiver to “de-
crypt” DB
 [s] as in the original ASPIR protocol of Section 5. The rest of the
protocol remains the same as in the threshold case.
Now we give a brief overview on how the master secret x is jointly selected by
(A1,A 2,A 3,A 4), and how the shares are generated and distributed. For 1 ≤ i ≤
4, owner Ai chooses si ∈R Z∗
q, and generates a random 3rd-degree polynomial in
Zq, fi(X)=si +

3
j=1 aijXj.L e tf(X)=

4
i=1 fi(X). If we set x =

4
i=1 si,
then {xj = f(j), 1 ≤ j ≤ 4} is valid set of (4,4)-threshold shares of x.N o t e
that x is uniquely determined at this point, and yet unknown to any of the
Ai’s individually. Next, the share tuples are distributed as follows. Consider for
instance the share tuple (x2,x 4) intended for A1.F o r2≤ i ≤ 4, owner Ai
sends (fi(2),f i(4)) to A1.N e x t ,A1 obtains the desired shares by computing
xj =

4
i=1 fi(j), for j ∈{ 2,4}. The remaining share tuples for A2,A 3,a n d
A4 are distributed in the same way. The share distribution above can be made
veriﬁable using the technique of [23].
10 The Case of an Owner Tuple Possessing Multiple
Records
So far, we have assumed that each tuple (A,B,C) could own at most one single
record. In the following we brieﬂy discuss the case where a tuple of owners
may possess k ≥ 1 records. The goal now is to allow these owners to issue an
authorization to the Receiver so that he can retrieve their k records. One trivial
way to do this is as follows. First, add one argument to the index(...) function,
specifying the rank of record. For example, si = index(A,B,C,i) will now denote
the index of the ith record (among k) belonging to (A,B,C). The owners now
give the Receiver an authorization for each DB[si], and the retrieval proceeds as
in the basic case.
To avoid the issuing of multiple authorizations, we can use the following
method. The value of Pm in the authorization issued to the Receiver is now com-
puted as Pm = H(IDA,IDB,IDC,RecID,P), and each of the owners provides the400 M. Layouni, M. Yoshida, and S. Okamura
Receiver with a signature σi(Pm): =( Pm)xi. The Receiver then aggregates the
σi’s into one single signature Sig(Pm): =

u∈{A,B,C}σu(Pm) as in section 5.3.
A similar modiﬁcation is required on the Sender’s side as well. For j ∈ [1,N],
the Sender computes the Pmj’s rather as Pmj = H(IDj,1,IDj,2,IDj,3,RecID,P).
Note that the identities IDj,u, u ∈ [1,3], of the record owners are readily avail-
able to the Sender along with the corresponding public keys pkj,u, u ∈ [1,3].
The Sender then computes DB
 [j]f r o mD B [ j] as in section 5.3 using the new
value of Pmj instead. As a result of the above modiﬁcations, we note that for
all indexes si = index(IDj,1,IDj,2,IDj,3,i), i ∈ [1,k] , referencing the records
belonging owner tuple (IDj,1,IDj,2,IDj,3), the value of Pmj is the same, and the
entries DB[si] are all encrypted with the same “key”: e(Pmj,
3
u=1 pkj,u)δ.T h e
Receiver ﬁnally SPIR retrieves the entries DB
 [si] one by one, and decrypts them
using his aggregate signature Sig(Pm) as in the basic case.
In the above scheme, the Receiver SPIR retrieves the the DB
 [si]’s sepa-
rately. This can be improved using a method based on the hybrid encryption
paradigm [26]. First we modify the setting to include two databases DB1 and
DB2.E a c he n t r yi nD B 1 is used to store a key corresponding to a triplet of own-
ers. The database DB2 on the other hand, is used to store the actual owners’
records encrypted under the keys kept in DB1, using some data encapsulation
mechanism (DEM)6[26]. DB2 is such that the records belonging to a given tuple
of owners are all encrypted under the same key. In order to grant access to their
records, the owners (A,B,C) give the Receiver an authorization to retrieve their
encryption key from DB1 (using the construction of section 5.3.) And using this
key, the Receiver decrypts all the DB2 records belonging to (A,B,C). Note that
if DB2 can be made public, the Receiver does not need to run the SPIR scheme
again to retrieve the encrypted records.
11 Conclusion
The paper presents a special access control protocol for databases containing
sensitive personal data. In particular, the described constructions allow a Re-
ceiver to retrieve a record in the database, if and only if (a) he has authorizations
from all (resp. a threshold portion of) the target record owners, and (b) the con-
text in which the database is queried, is consistent with a usage policy chosen
by the owners of the target record, and embedded in authorizations issued to
the Receiver. The above is achieved without the database manager being able to
learn any information about the index of the target record or the identity of its
owners. The proposed construction is proved secure under the BDH assumption.
The paper also presents a construction where the owners of a record do not have
equal ownership rights. The protocol we propose in this paper is more eﬃcient
than the one in [7] and can be constructed with any SPIR primitive. Despite the
increase in functionality, the presented protocol does not lead to a complexity
higher than that of the underlying SPIR.
6 Note that DEM could be any symmetric-key encryption scheme (e.g., AES.)Eﬃcient Multi-authorizer ASPIR 401
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